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Debt-Restructuring Program for Heavily Indebted Farm Households in Korea

Seong-Jae Park
Office of Planning and Coordination
Korea Rural Economic Institute
4-102, Hoegi-dong, Dongdaemun-gu
Seoul, Korea, 2004-10-01

Abstract

Farm household debt has been a major issue in Korean agriculture since the 1980s. The increasing trend has been attributed to a variety of factors from natural disasters to unfavorable macroeconomic policies, lack of labor due to urban migration, farm commercialization, and the new trade environment brought about by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, debt measures have been enacted since 1987 to help stabilize the farm household economy and rural communities. These measures have been mainly focused on deferring repayment, lowering interest rates, lending new loans, or supplying concessionary loans. The main sources of farm loans are the government, agricultural cooperatives, and other financial institutions. Despite consecutive debt measures introduced, however, farm household debts have steadily increased without any reduction (except 2002) since 1980. In particular, many farmers have fallen victim to the private credit guarantee system since the currency crisis of 1997. A workout program, essentially a government-initiated debt restructuring program, may help heavily indebted farms. However, whether these measures have been effective in solving the debt problem of farmers remains a question. There is a need to appraise them on the basis of cost versus benefit, negative effects, and the contribution of the whole financial system

Abstract

Introduction

Farm household debt has long been a major issue in Korean agriculture since the 1980s. It has been a symbol of agricultural policy failure and has been exploited as a political issue in every election. Thus, debt measures have been enacted to help stabilize the farm household economy and rural communities. In 1987, the Measure of Lessening Debt Burden of Farm and Fishery Households was first1 implemented in Korea and since then, debt measures have been either revised or added.

Debt measures in Korea are mainly focused on deferring repayment, lowering interest rates, lending new loans, or supplying concessionary loans. The main sources of farm loans are the government, agricultural cooperatives, and other financial institutions. The government plays a lead role in providing policy loans that are channeled to borrowers via the agricultural cooperatives and take a big share in agricultural financial markets.

Despite consecutive debt measures introduced, however, farm household debts have steadily increased without any reduction (except 2002) since 1980. As a solution, the government revised the Special Act of Lessening Farm and Fishery Household Debt, enacted in 2000, which allows extending the repayment of policy loans over 20 years with 1.5 percent interest rate per year.

In general, eligibility conditions of debt measures have been so generous that most farm households could be beneficiaries. This implies that the measures may cause substantial moral hazards such as providing disincentives to normal repayments. Moreover, these measures undermine income redistribution since the borrowers with large debts get more subsidies.

The debt measures in Korea have not been sufficient in terms of supporting financially fragile farms. If a farm household has delinquent loans, for example, it cannot be eligible for the program because it lacks creditworthiness. But it is the financially fragile farm households that should be on top of the list of beneficiaries, if it is a true debt program. The financially fragile farms need a debt restructuring program such as a workout program. The government thus established the Farm Management Rehabilitation Fund for heavily indebted farm households in 2003.

This paper describes the current situation of debt problems in Korea and briefly touches on the debt measures that have been enacted since 1987.

Farm Household Debt Problem in Korea

Debt Trends

According to the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO), the country's debt per farm household at the end of 2003 was 27 million won2 (about US$22,000). It was the first time the total income exceeded 26.5 million won. The debt increased 2.6 percent from that of 2002, when the debt size decreased 2.3 percent for the first time since 1973. Therefore, these statistics seem to be inconsistent with the stagnating recent trends3, but it is enough to symbolize the severe debt problem of farm households.

Farm household debts have rapidly increased, exceeding consumption expenditure in 1998 and the total income in 2003 ( Fig. 1(1397).) The increasing trend of debts started from the mid-1970s when agriculture suffered labor shortage as rural population migrated to the urban areas amid farming commercialization. Especially, the trend accelerated in the early 1980s due to consecutive natural disasters, macroeconomic policies unfavorable to the agricultural sector, and policy failure of income-generating projects such as cattle breeding.

Facing the new trade environment symbolized by the WTO regime, Korea eagerly tried to speed up the adoption of high technology and structural adjustment in the early 1990s. The government created the Integrated Rural Development Program and injected 42 trillion won (about US$50 billion) into the agricultural and rural sectors from 1992 to 1998. In addition, the government established the Special Tax for Agriculture and Rural Areas in 1994, which led to a collection of 15 trillion won in taxes from 1995 to 2004, designed for technical innovation and rural development. These efforts affected the farm household economy, increasing both assets and debts. The assets generated income but the debt pressed the farm household economy with the repayment burden.

The debts further increased from 1993 when the Structural Adjustment Programs started and expanded the pipeline for agricultural investments. Income also grew rapidly until 1996 although the increasing rate of debt exceeded that of income during the period.

The environment of Korea's farm household economy substantially changed since the mid-1990s ( Fig. 2(1107)). Domestic food consumption has been stagnant, while supply has steadily grown because of technical innovation and imports. Thus, producers could not increase their selling prices, at times even lowering these, even if purchasing prices continued to rise. This imbalance caused cash flow problems and led to bankruptcy. The currency crisis worsened the farm household economy, making repayment of mid- and long-term loans due since 1998 difficult. Thus, the debt problem emerged as one of the hottest issues since the spring of 1998.

Borrowing Sources and Purposes of Lending

The agricultural cooperatives are the largest sources of farm household loans in Korea. Farmers borrowed 84.2 percent of their loans from the agricultural cooperatives that included primary cooperatives and their federation, the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF). The second source was other financial institutions including commercial banks, local banks, savings banks, community credit cooperatives, and credit unions. The loans from informal financial markets constituted only 5 percent. Table 1(1162) shows the changes in the structure of rural financial markets since the mid-1970s, when the informal financial markets dominated the markets.

The largest amount of loans was used for production activities, which accounted for 75.5 percent of the total loaned amount in 2002. The loan for consumption or education took up 19.7 percent, while the loan for repayment was 4.8 percent in the same year. The share of lending for repayment that peaked in 1997 with 11 percent declined after the implementation of debt measures at the end of the 1990s.

Debt Distribution by Farm Household Type

Farm household debt shows different distribution by farm household type such as farm size, manager's age, location, crops or livestock. The debt may be related to the farm manager's motivation for farming, cost competitiveness, or policy support.

The debt size of large farms is likely to be bigger than that of small farms because investments get bigger as the farm size increases ( Fig. 3(1433)). The debts of farms with over 5 ha of land were much bigger than those with lesser areas, sharply increasing until 2000. But the largest farm with over 5 ha of land substantially reduced its debts in recent years, even in 1998 when the currency crisis shocked the whole national economy. This may imply that large farms have sufficient capacity to repay or use debt as one of their portfolios. In 1998, the interest rates were very high, so no farm wanted to increase its debts if possible. But most farms, except the largest ones, saw their debts increasing.

Younger farmers tended to have more debts due to the strategic support of government since they were regarded as successors and the hope of future agriculture. They were also heavily supported by the government. In addition, their ambitious nature made them less concerned about financial risks, so they invested, using borrowed fund, a lot of money into farming. Since they did not have experience and skills in farming or their own capital, many of them faced financial stress and the threat of bankruptcy.

Livestock farms and flower farms had relatively bigger debts as they invested in buildings and facilities such as barns, milking machines, prevention facilities for pollution, and glass greenhouses. In recent years, the debts in Jeju and Gangwon Provinces were much bigger than those in other areas. Their debts, too, grew the fastest. This might be related to replacement investments of fruits in Jeju and of vegetables and livestock in Gangwon. Rice farms were moderately indebted.

The distribution of debts by debt size took the shape of a double-headed drum pinched in the middle. The farm households with no debts increased from 20.4 percent in 1997 to 26.0 percent in 2001, while the farm households with debts over 30 million won increased from 14.8 to 24.3 percent during the same period.

Among farm households, the view on the debt problem was also different, depending on the debt size and debt burden. Since there was a big difference between debt size and repayment capacity, it was not desirable to regard all farm households as having the same problem to merit applying the same criteria and solutions.

Repayment Capacity of Farm Households

The short-term repayment capacity seems to have improved in recent years after the currency crisis shook the nation in 1997. The ratio of financial asset to debt declined from 73.7 percent in 1998 to 53.6 percent in 2002. The farm households with no debt increased from 20.4 percent to 26.0 percent from 1997 to 2001. The share of farm households with negative cash flow decreased from 49.9 to 30.3 percent from 1998 to 2002. The farm households that repaid the policy loans, although they could choose to postpone the repayment if they wanted, increased from 42.5 percent in 2001 to 78.8 percent in 2002.

However, the long-run repayment capacity shows a different trend. The leverage ratio (debt/total assets) of average farms increased from 7.1 percent in 1997 to 11.7 percent in 2002. Although it is not so bad, it is certain that the financial structure is deteriorating.

At the individual farm household level, however, the distribution of leverage ratio shows a different picture compared with the average level. Among total farm households, 10.8 percent showed over 40 percent leverage ratio at the end of 2001, and this figure increased to 12.1 percent in 2002. (Park, Hwang, and Kim 2002)4. The share of risky farms with the leverage over 40 percent increased along with the increasing debt size. Among the farms with less than 10 million won in debt, only 0.1 percent belonged to this category, but it became 21.5 percent in the group of 30-50 million won in debts, 46.4 percent in the group of 50-100 million won in debts, and 74.8 percent in the group of over 100 million won in debts ( Table 2(1246)). In fact, the farm households with 100 million won in debts seemed to have difficulty in finding credit in the market. Of those with 100 million won in debts, 35.1 percent had 70 percent leverage ratio, which meant they were nearly insolvent.

The long-run repayment capacity has been relatively better than the short-run capacity that has improved in recent years. However, some farmers with large debts seemed to have found it difficult to keep farming because of the heavy financial burden. Since agriculture has not been so profitable and has been risky, they have been inclined to reduce debt size. The short-run repayment capacity has not been so good, although it has improved in recent years.

The short-term repayment capacity has improved, thanks to the postponement of the repayment schedule. However, the prospect of easing the debt problem has not been good. Although the situation has improved in terms of short-run repayment capacity, about one-third of farm households still suffer from the negative cash flow, such that they still have to borrow loans or sell their assets. Moreover, the farm households that are financially fragile because of the high leverage have increased in number, despite the strong support from the government on debt measures.

Private Credit Guarantee

In Korea, private credit guarantee has been used as a traditional practice in borrowing money from banks. The guarantors are usually family members, relatives, friends, or neighbors. In general, farmers do not like to use collateral to borrow money. Thus, they ask neighbors to guarantee their loans and provide something in turn.

Most farmers have a number of loans borrowed from financial institutions, out of which some loans are privately guaranteed by the neighbors. This forms a network of credit guarantee and becomes complicated as time goes by. Most residents in a village are connected to each other via the debt guarantee relationship. Therefore, a rural community as a whole can go insolvent like a domino, if one of the borrowers goes bankrupt.

Many farmers have fallen victim to the private credit guarantee system since the currency crisis of 1997. The loans privately guaranteed amounted to 44 percent of the total outstanding loans of the agricultural cooperatives at the end of April 1999 ( Table 3(1068)). Farmers' worries became a reality and shook rural communities. Most people agree that this vicious chain should be cut down and the government has to do this.

Farm Household Debt Measures

Debt Measures in the 1980S

Farm household debts have rapidly increased since the late 1970s as farm commercialization and mechanization accelerated. As the Korean economy grew rapidly industrialized, farm labors declined as the demand for food from urban sectors increased. These changes in the economic structure pressed farmers to expand investments in farming and resulted in rapid expansion of debts. Furthermore, consecutive natural disasters from 1978 to 1980 severely struck the farm household economy.

Macroeconomic policies in the early 1980s also unfavorably affected farm households. The government froze purchasing prices of rice to press down inflation, which substantially reduced revenues of farm households. In addition, deregulation of loan rates changed real interest rates imposed on farmers from minus to plus, which increased the burden of farm household debts.

Especially, a long and deep wave of cow price fluctuations from 1983 to 1986 hit most farm households raising cattle and resulted in a rapid increase in their debts. Since reaching the peak in 1983, the cow price has sharply dropped and steadily declined until the summer of 1986. In fact, the price shock was ignited by the income-generating policy of the government, which supported farm households intending to buy cattle because raising cattle generated relatively high incomes. An increase in demand for cattle pushed up its price until the spring of 1983, which caused massive importation of calves from the United States. However, this led to an excess supply and resulted in a sharp drop of cattle price. Thus, this cattle debacle was recognized as a representative policy failure of the government.

Farm household income growth slowed down because of stagnant farm incomes, while consumption expenditure steadily increased. Farm households' cash flows deteriorated and their debts rapidly increased, which caused credit crunch and bankruptcies in rural communities. Farmers got angry and took to the streets to demonstrate against the government and demand solutions. As the parliamentary election of 1987 approached, politicians began coming up with plans to soothe rural communities.

The government announced the Measure of Lessening Debt Burden of Farm and Fishery Households in March 1987. It included replacing the debts from informal financial markets with policy loans, lowering interest rates of policy loans, and differing repayment of policy loans.

However, many farmers and politicians criticized the measure, saying that it was not enough to solve the debt problem, and asked for expansion of benefits. The government facing the presidential election at the end of 1987 accepted the farmers' demand and announced a new version of the debt measure. However, it was not the last one. The debt measures were revised again and again until the end of 1989.

Debt Measures after the 1997 Currency Crisis

In 1998, the agricultural sector suffered a triple blow that included the currency crisis of late 1997, the simultaneous arrival of repayment due dates of many policy loans, and the deteriorating terms of trade for farm households. The 1997 currency crisis paralyzed the supply channel of feedsand oil, shrank the demand for food, and caused a sharp fall of prices of agricultural products. From December 1997 to March 1998, many livestock and vegetable farms went bankrupt because of elevated operating costs and lowered revenues. During the period, many animals starved because of the lack of feeds, and vegetables and flowers in greenhouses withered because of gas shortage.

Also in 1998, the substantial portion of policy loans was used to repay the principals, which implied an abrupt increase in cash outflow. Korea substantially raised the investments into the agricultural sector from 1992 when the Uruguay Round of Negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was coming in. The policy target was to enhance the market competitiveness of the agricultural sector through technical and managerial innovation. Agricultural policy changed from focusing on equity and supporting small farms to emphasizing efficiency and structural adjustment. The government supplied large amounts of mid- and long-term loans to large farms and young farmers through the agricultural cooperative channel. From 1992 to 1998, the central government provided 39.5 trillion won (about US$32.7 billion) to the agricultural sector.

The terms of trade for farm households have steadily deteriorated since the mid-1990s. The purchasing price indices have rapidly risen but the selling price indices have not. This was because improved productivity and the increasing imports of agricultural products resulted in oversupply, which pressed down the prices of agricultural products ( Fig. 2(1107)).

The government drafted a measure to solve the debt problem in 1998, when the currency crisis severely shook the agricultural sector. Main contents of the measure included postponing the policy loan repayment for two years, lowering interest rates, and supplying special mid-term loans to farms suffering from the high burden of debts and liquidity pressure.

However, most farmers did not appreciate the measure as a proper and sufficient program to alleviate the difficulty of the farm household economy. Thus, the government increased the amount of special mid-term loans and added new measures such as replacing the privately guaranteed loans with the publicly guaranteed ones in 1999 and 2000. Especially, the national assembly passed the Special Act of Lessening Farm and Fishery Household Debts at the end of 2000. According to the law, farmers could postpone the repayment of policy loans up to five years including a two-year grace period. The special mid-term loans were were worth 3.1 trillion won. In addition, the Mutual Credit Loans, the cooperative loans with higher interest rates compared with policy loans, were replaced with cheaper loans. The government provided concessionary loans with 5 percent interest rate per year for the victims of guaranteeing debts for their neighbors. An incentive refund or 20 percent of interest repaid was introduced to encourage the voluntary repayments rather than postponement of policy loans ( Table 4(1129)).

The debt problem became a hot issue again during the presidential elections in 2002. The market interest rates declined from 10 percent to 6 percent. Farmer groups persistently asked the government to revise the act. Furthermore, the ruling and opposition parties announced that they would solve the debt problem if they would win the presidential election. The debt act was consequently revised and its benefits were greatly expanded.

The revised act allowed farmers to repay the mid- and long-term policy loans over a 20-year repayment, including a five-year grace period. The loans' interest rates were lowered from 5 percent to 1.5 percent. The government supplied additional loans to replace the existing Mutual Credit Loans, and lowered the interest rates from 6.5 percent to 3 percent for the loans provided before 2000. The interest rates of Managerial Improvement Loans were also lowered from 6.5 percent to 3 percent. The repayment schedule of the Special Loans for the Victims of Private Guarantees was extended from 10 to 20 years, including a three-year grace period. In addition, the interest exemption incentive that returns some of the interests paid on the time schedule to the borrowers increased from 20 percent to 40 percent of the interest repayment.

Farm Management Rehabilitation Fund

The programs to save indebted farm households are heavily based on the assumption that farmers should prove themselves creditworthy, that is, those applying for debt measures must have no arrears. This does not seem logical because the government should have more concern for indebted farmers rather than those with a sound financial base. Nonetheless, little attention was given to the poor farmers with arrears or were insolvent. The government took the position that the Program of Farm Management Rehabilitation Fund would support the indebted farm households whose debts occurred after the 2004 debt measures were in place.

The Farm Management Rehabilitation Fund is meant to finance the farm households under the managerial crisis caused by natural disasters, sharp price drops, and livestock diseases. The fund is provided as a loan to be repaid over seven years after a three-year grace period with a 3 percent interest rate.

Only full-time farmers operating farms of substantial scale are eligible for this program. A committee of debt measure appraises the applicant's managerial performance and decides whether or not to support the farmer. The committee examines the farm household's cash flow. If the cash flow is positive with the government's financial support, the government provides rehabilitation fund to the applicant. If the committee evaluates the applicant as not financially able, it recommends selling the assets on the condition that the buyer can use the Farm Management Rehabilitation Fund.

The fund is supposed to be a workout program in the agricultural sector. However, the system still does not work because of several problems such as the shortage of managerial records, the lack of specialists in the area, and the lack of will to implement it. It is not different from the Managerial Improvement Loan in which loan officers examine the cash flow based on the estimates. The agricultural cooperative or the government does not demand the borrowers to conduct financial restructuring, even though their debt size owes to the expansion of credit supply.

Effects and Limits of the Debt Measures

The debt measures since 1987 supported most borrowers to reduce the repayment burden, and they contributed to stabilize rural communities. However, there were little screening processes for borrowers. This led to distortion of income redistribution. The fragile farm households under heavy debt burden did not get the sufficient support they needed from the measures because of budget constraints. Ironically, however, the farms with sound financial status and had no need to get support also had access to the debt measures. Thus, the measures were criticized as a policy failure.

Although the Korean government often has used these kinds of debt measures since 1987, there have been no action plans to support fragile farms in terms of financial structure. The agricultural cooperatives are the most important financial institutions and dominant financial entities in the rural communities, but they have not provided independent financial services to reconstruct fragile farms' debts. Most farm households have easily fallen into the trap of financial failure when the external shocks such as natural disasters or abrupt price drops hit. If a farm turned delinquent and incurred arrears, the interest rates of arrear debts became very high, making it hard for the indebted farm to repay, eventually driving it to bankruptcy.

Financial restructuring could be the solution for indebted farmers. It would also help if there was a support system for the aricultural financial system to allow farmers a smooth exit from the markets. Up to now, there are no institutions or functions to guide farmers to exit through selling or the legal bankrupt process. Most farmers who are bankrupt suffer the burden of repaying even if they can no longer do so.

Prospects of the Debt Problem

The debt problem has no simple solution even in the near future. Basically, it is hard to expect the debt problem to be solved without sufficient income growth. Most farmers think that the environment surrounding the agricultural sector is too bad to overcome. For one, the barriers for imported agricultural products entering the local markets will be lower as time will go by, and no sooner will imported foreign foods flood the local markets. Many people believe that the Korean farm size is too small to compete with those of foreign producers.

Some suggest that government should push the structural adjustments in agriculture by choosing and concentrating on a strategy to support a few elite farmers with the potential to compete. However, Korean agriculture has been structurally adjusted as fast as other countries have adjusted. If the adjustment process is sped up further, rural communities may break down. Moreover, most farmers have very low mobility. They are too old to change jobs and too poor to operate businesses in the nonfarming sectors.

In fact, the farms whose incomes nominally declined in the past five years (1998-2002) were 39.9 percent of the total farm households (Park, Hwang, and Kim 2003) Table 5(1279)). On the contrary, the farms whose debts increased were 53.9 percent in the same period despite the debt measures being strongly implemented. Many agricultural economists expect that it will be very hard to keep farm incomes at the current level in nominal value until 2013. With this gloomy prospect, farmers will not try to expand investments so that the debt may be stagnant in the near future.

Conclusion and Recommendations

A workout program as an alternative for the debt measures has to be considered for heavily indebted farms. The workout program consists of an executing committee, fund to support the program, and financial institutions. The executing committee makes rules and criteria for screening farm households that are qualified to apply for the workout program; designs the financial restructuring programs; and monitors the overall workout program's processes. Any financial institution working for the agricultural sector can participate in the executing committee and the workout program related to the loans they provide. The committee screens out the disqualified farm households applying for the workout and suggests a proper debt restructuring program for both the lenders and the borrowers. If the lenders agree to the suggested program, the workout process will start for the borrowers.

In the rural areas, the counseling service committee for the farm household debts will be established to screen and evaluate the workout program. A committee will cover several counties and some committee members will be chosen among the persons not related to the areas. A farmer in need of help can apply for the workout program at the primary agricultural cooperatives in the area or the financial institutions, and the local government offices can recommend farmers to apply for the program.

The fund for the workout program can be contributed by the central government, local governments, and financial institutions working on the revitalization of farm households. It is important for the local governments to join this program since they are responsible for supporting their residents and have substantial information about the farm households. Because some local governments are financially poor, the central government has to support local governments in securing the workout program funds through subsidies.

The workout program will design and operate diverse support schemes such as lowering interest rates, postponing repayment schedules, replacing the loans with concessionary interest rate loans, or making other financial restructuring programs. For the farm households with huge debts, they need financial restructuring rather than debt structuring. The high debt ratio (debt/assets) could be reduced through selling assets. It is important to encourage the borrowers to overcome their debts and implement restructuring works. The workout committee should sign a memorandum of understanding with the borrowers, indicating that the committee can terminate it when the borrowers do not keep their words.

If a farm size decreases because of sales in assets, the farm households will face problems in generating income and revitalization. In this case, the farmer may opt to rent the farmland before selling. This idea is workable when a public institution buys and leases the land to the farmer-seller. This way, the farmer can pay the interest of his debts before selling the land, and pay the rent later. The key idea is to compare the rent with interest payments. In Korea, the rent of a farmland is cheaper than the interest of loans, so the idea may be feasible. However, the land market should be flexible and remain in a stable condition. If the price of land price drops continuously for a long period, this idea will not be workable.

Some farmers are not able to repay their debts in the long run and suffer financial and psychological stress. Writing off their debts after selling their farmland may be the solution. In this case, the government may provide job training and shoulder the related cost and the cost of moving. At present, however, many bankrupt farmers are leaving their hometowns without any preparation and hope.

References

  • Park, S.J., E.S. Hwang, and T.K. Kim. 2003. A Study on a Workout Program for Farm Households in Korea. Korea Rural Economic Institute. (in Korean).
  • Park, S.J., Y.T. Kim, and E.S. Hwang.1999. Policy Direction for Farm Household Debt Problem. Korea Rural Economic Institute. (in Korean).
  • Suh, C.H. and S.J. Park. 1985. A Study on the Structural Changes in Assets and Borrowings of Farm Households in Korea. Korea Rural Economic Institute.
  • Franks, J.R. n.d. Predicting financial stress in farm businesses. European Review of Agricultural Economics.
  • United States Department of Agriculture. 1996. Are farmer bankruptcies a good indicator of rural financial stress? ERS, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 724-06.

Footnotes:

1 The Rural Usury Elimination Program in 1961 was the first debt measure under the military government, but this paper only covered cases since 1980.

2 Korean currency unit.

3 New samples of the statistics of farm household economy are obtained every five years, and the 2003 statistics were based on new samples. There is usually a gap between the statistics of old and new samples, so it is not certain whether the debt trend has changed from stagnation to increment in 2003.

4 In the US, it is common to classify the farm households with 40-70 percent of leverage ratio as risky, those with 70-100 percent as close to insolvency, and those with over 100 percent as bankruptcy.

Index of Images

Figure 1 Trends in Income, Consumption, and Debt of a Farm Household

Figure 1 Trends in Income, Consumption, and Debt of a Farm Household

Figure 2 Trends in the Terms of Trade of Farm Households (Selling Price Index/Purchasing Price Index)

Figure 2 Trends in the Terms of Trade of Farm Households (Selling Price Index/Purchasing Price Index)

Figure 3 Trends in Farm Household Debts by Farm Class

Figure 3 Trends in Farm Household Debts by Farm Class

Table 1 Borrowing Sources of Farm Household

Table 1 Borrowing Sources of Farm Household

Table 2 Farm Household Distribution by Leverage Ratio and Debt Size

Table 2 Farm Household Distribution by Leverage Ratio and Debt Size

Table 3 Privately Guaranteed Loans at the End of April 1999

Table 3 Privately Guaranteed Loans at the End of April 1999

Table 4 Programs of Debt Measures by the Special Act of 2001.

Table 4 Programs of Debt Measures by the Special Act of 2001.

Table 5 Farm Household Distribution by Changes in Debt Size and Farm Land, 1998-2002

Table 5 Farm Household Distribution by Changes in Debt Size and Farm Land, 1998-2002

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